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Preface 
This thesis is an essay in the history of 
ideas. It is an attempt to characterize in detail some 
of the main features of agnosticism - the intellectual 
movement gathered around T.H. Huxley, H. Spencer, J. 
Tyndall, L. Stephen, and W.K. Clifford, during the last 
four decades of the nineteenth century. General accounts 
of this movement already exist - for example, A.W. Benn, 
The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth 
Century, R. Metz, ~undred Years of British Philosophz -
and there are good studies of some of the individual 
figures - for example, H. Petersen, Huxlez: Prophet o! 
~cience, N. Annan, Leslie Stephen, but, as far as I know, 
no one has produced a detailed historical study of the 
agnostics as a group, particularly as a group of 
philosophers. This work is an attempt to meet this need. 
Obviously, an historical account of an 
intellectual movement must not only provide expositions 
of its distinctive doctrines, it must also place the 
school generally in the context of its age. The 
'Introductory' section is concerned with this latter 
aim. It may appear, at first, to be out of proportion 
to the rest of the work, but in view of what has been 
written about agnosticism it has been necessary to go 
(vi) 
beyond a general exposition of agnostic doctrines and 
their roots to consider in what sense the agnostics can 
be called by that name, and to explain how agnosticism 
differs from empiricism - J.S. Mill, A. Bain, G. Croom 
Robertson - and positivism - R. Congreve, F. Harrison, 
J.H. Bridges - two other Victorian intellectual 
movements. 
In the first section the following points are 
made. The pattern of agnostic theory is based on three 
doctrines: that there are necessary limits to knowledge, 
and the objects of metaphysical speculation fall outside 
these limits; that the methods of science are the only 
rational and moral means by which knowledge is to be 
gained; the groundlessness of the Christian faith. 
Examination of what HUXley and his contemporaries have 
to say on the nature of agnosticism shows that the word 
was often used to designate this pattern of belief. 
The origins of agnosticism are found in three 
deeply rooted nineteenth century British intellectual 
tendencies: a distrust of metaphysical speculation, faith 
in the power of science, and dissatisfaction with 
Christian orthodoxy. In different ways each of these 
tendencies gain expression in agnosticism, positivism, 
and empiricism. Of these three movements agnosticism 
(vii) 
was the last to appear. But while it owes a certain 
amount to both movements, particularly empiricism, it 
did not, like positivism, accept Comte as its prophet, 
and unlike empiricism it found in the concept of 
evolution as used in Darwin's On the Origin of Species 
a way of understanding nearly all aspects of the universe. 
Basically, these are the points which separate agnosticism 
from positivism and empiricism. 
The remaining sections of the work expound the 
agnostics' doctrines. The organization of the material 
is based on two principles: one is that the main elements 
in the pattern of agnostic belief should be set out; the 
other is that attention ought to be paid to the particular 
stresses in their system of thought. As the agnostic 
rejection of Christianity is based on their theories of 
ignorance and the nature of science and morality there 
is not a separate section dealing with their anti-christian 
position, but there is one which deals with agnostic 
theories of the limits of knowledge, particularly as they 
bear upon theological matters - 'Learned Ignorance' - and 
another dealing with agnostic theories of science. 
In 'Learned Ignorance' the theories of H.L. 
mansel are examined in some detail because his work, 
despite its Christian purpose, exercised a strong influence 
upon the agnostics, as is seen by the use Spencer and 
(viii) 
Stephen make or his doctrines in recommending their 
anti-christian positions. In the next section, 'The 
Nature of Science', the differences between Clifford 
and the other agnostics over the nature of science are 
discussed, particularly with reference to the criticism 
their theories received from Christian apologists who 
wished to deny that there is any real conflict between 
science and religion. 
'The Science of Ethics' is the final section of 
the work. From one point of view this section is a 
development of the preceding one; for the agnostic claim 
that science alone provides sure knowledge means that 
they had to be able to show how science can provide 
knowledge of the foundations and superstructure of 
morality. They took to this task with great seriousness; 
the most elaborate products of the agnostic movement deal 
with this problem. Here the leading figures are Clifford, 
Spencer, and Stephen, with HUXley joining hands with those 
Christian and non-christian critics who claimed that moral 
obligation could not be completely explained in scientific 
terms. On the question of moral responsibility and 
determinism, the agnostics present a solid front against 
those who assert that the two are incompatible. Because 
of the extent of agnostic ethical writings it has seemed 
(ix) 
best to consider them in a separate section. 
In the 'Conclusion' the significance of the 
agnostic movement is discussed, Three points are made: 
firstly, that philosophically the products of agnosticism 
are not of much intrinsic worth; secondly, that their 
writings are important for the influence, often a negative 
influence, they had upon philosophers of greater stature -
for example, H. Sidgwick, w. James, s. Alexander, J. ward; 
thirdly, the movement is of importance if we are to 
Understand the change that came over the Victorian frame 
of mind between 1860 and 1900, for while it is difficult 
to assess causes in such a matter it does not seem unlikely 
that the agnostics played some part in producing this 
change. 
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